
Today's show: “Establishing a 'safe' place to plan and express our love: places for the cultivation of soul-sufficiency... which necessarily means: helping each other get 'big' – the process of reclaiming... sharing... and expanding our original 'selves'...” (Part 28)

[“151025economyofhonor.mp3”:]

[In our musical tribute to “love triumphing over global-'power'” we also gave thanks for Aretha Franklin. The unwanted attention I have received as a result of my speaking out about the need for us to reclaim our human energy and become “fully-developing individualities” has opened my eyes to the 'commonness' of punishment at the hands of the 'power'-mad... It is unlikely in the extreme that I would be harassed but not she... with her off-the-chart gifts and large audience... and a whole lot of 'heart' – I am so grateful for her strength... her model of perseverance... and her heart – heart... is *our* wealth... the wealth we must amass to get to our free future. Thank you Sister.]

How Kropotkin Would Define the Authentic 'Economy' of a Free Global Humanity: “Political economy... ought to occupy with respect to human societies a place in science similar to that held by physiology in relation to plants and animals. It must become the physiology of society. It should aim at studying the needs of society and the various means, both hitherto used and available under the present state of scientific knowledge, for their satisfaction. It should try to analyze how far the present means are expedient and satisfactory, economic or wasteful; and then... concern itself with the discovery of means for the satisfaction of these needs with the smallest possible waste of labor and with the greatest benefit to mankind in general...” (From “Modern Science and Anarchism”)

October 20, 2015... Sisters and Brothers: Now this is just common sense isn't it? I am certain that as we begin planning our new global social arrangement... premised on non-coercion and the limitless development of our gifts... we will find that most of what we come up with... is just common sense.

'Power' believes it has...by means of its 'political-economy'... 'organized' the world for us... into more-or-less nice... neat... packages... and that their acts manifest a “higher 'Reason'” that the rest of us... not being trained 'philosophers'... cannot possibly grasp... as... we are too trapped in the 'world of mere appearance'... in the mundane and gross 'material'... while they are embodiments of the supremely 'spiritual'... the purest 'Logic'... a crystalline (if opaque to the untrained) 'dialectics'.

And so... they... with the speed of their severity... of their ruthless conviction... applied their 'logic' to us... 'ruled' and 'ranked' us... applied these means... this scheme... to everything... according to their needs... for realizing their paterfamilias' dream... of the *Republic*– all life was to be ruled by this 'logic'... all life was to be fit into a category... a 'class'... with a quantity attached...

No matter that wherever they 'worked' their 'logic'... joyous freedom was supplanted by unhappiness... an unhappiness that spread 'round the world like a virus... the unhappiness that comes when life is forced to fit into their 'concept' of it...

We look at the earth and see that which feeds us... guides our feet... bears our stories... pilgrims with us... moors us when we come to her to sleep...

...but those who worship 'power' don't see these things... but rather only 'qualities' of their own invention... that either 'fit'... or 'don't fit'... into their 'concept' of it... that either submit without protest... or submit with punishment.

What we want is to structure our relations authentically... such that we can honor that to which we owe our lives and exuberance... our joy... Life begets life... whatever is given is returned – that is the 'economy' of honoring our relations and our gifts... of mutual interdependence... It does not waste – because there is no 'waste'... as we feed only that which lives... and when life is fed... it gives back in like... Feeding death makes more death... like a poison that in time travels through all life's intertwinings... freezing that which moves till all is still.

It is an illness... this restless need to rule over us... an atrophied... frozen... thought process that cannot reverence life. These are people who want the earth trashed – no matter what pretty words they put in their mouths against this – because then we can no longer... in relation with our earth... be self-sufficient. Profligacy... waste... works for them because it results in eventual material hardship for us... forces us to come to their terms... forces us to come begging to them. This is the sum total of all our efforts when subject to the 'power'-mad. This is where *their* 'economy' leads us inevitably: to material hardship... to cages and leashes.

[“151025weartruewealth.mp3”:]

Self-Sufficiency outside their 'economic' regimen thrives – exposes the lie that 'the economy' provides (which is why it then gets targeted by the 'power'-guys...)

We don't need 'the economy' to live... just the opposite... Rather... both within and beyond 'economics'... it is the opposite 'end' they have in mind for us... because they think we are too 'numerous'... as they have no 'jobs' to give... no ways for us to serve them...

It's time for us to plan our alternative to 'the system'...

Think of all the luxuries we used to have but have no more because our lives are not our own... we have no time (a.k.a. our lives...) to do them for each other: all our homemade you-fill-in-the-blank... our body-loving-massages... our walks... and time unbounded with ourselves...

...we are true wealth... we know this... but we're made to forget... by all that 'busyness' they give... to 'occupy' our heads... and stop our thinking... close our eyes...

...except... now they can't provide the 'jobs' in sufficient number to accomplish this...

...and so resumes our thought process... and so we start to see again.

We are true wealth... we do luxurious things with those we love naturally...

...and in freedom... 'those we love' expands continuously – yet another luxury we give... in freedom.

The Internet of course was made precisely for this moment... to tie us closer together... to speed our reunion... and to speed all the interconnections of Freedom... ensuring there is no 'want' in *its* 'kingdom'...

These thoughts we're thinking now... these freedom-thoughts... are not new thoughts (under 'class'...) Kropotkin and many others show us this... but what's different now from our earlier attempts to get our freedom... is that we see how we've been misled... by this whole notion of a 'Progress' derived from the lie of 'Mind-deification'...

They've used up all their cons... this time we'll get our freedom...

...but we have to start discussing it... we have to embed our new understanding in the broader population...

[“151025discussionbreakstheirhold.mp3”:]

It was important to these Plato's Tribesmen that we believe in their supposed 'superiority'... for myriad reasons intertwined... but a significant one we see... distinct from their need to establish their 'rule's legitimacy... is:

...they need themselves to believe it... Recall what Popper said in our radio show of October 11, 2015 – and I have to say... I cannot read this without getting the chills... on the one hand... by the horrors wrought by this one man Plato... and on the other... by the chilling thought of how much depended... on Popper:

... What kind of lies has Plato in mind when he exhorts his rulers to use strong medicine? Crossman rightly emphasizes that Plato means “propaganda, the technique of controlling the behaviour of... the bulk of the ruled majority.” Certainly, Plato had these first in his mind; but when Crossman suggests that the propaganda lies were only intended for the consumption of the ruled, while the rulers should be a fully enlightened intelligentsia, then I cannot agree. I think, rather, that Plato's complete break with anything resembling Socrates' intellectualism is nowhere more obvious than in the place where he twice expresses his hope that even *the rulers themselves*, at least after a few generations, might be induced to believe his greatest propaganda lie; I mean his racialism, his Myth of Blood and Soil, known as the Myth of the Metals in Man and of the Earthborn. Here we see that Plato's utilitarian and totalitarian principles overrule everything, even the ruler's privilege of knowing and of demanding to be told, the truth. The motive of Plato's wish that the rulers themselves should believe in the propaganda lie is his hope of increasing its wholesome effect, i.e. of strengthening the rule of the master race, and ultimately, of arresting all political change. (*The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato*, p. 138 – 140)

We have been trapped by people trapped in their deeply-implanted misconceptions... who have become like robots... function on 'automatic' – they cannot be reasoned with (and I'm talking about these global-state-statesmen... not those who do their bidding out of some form of compulsion...)

...but as we... one by one... begin having our broad globe-encompassing discussions... planning how to inaugurate a new social arrangement... on the fresh premises of non-coercion and the full development of our gifts through self-creation... the very range and depth of our vision... the fact that we see the world itself as our province... will be... for these 'power'-guys... deeply disturbing... profoundly unnerving...

...as the very act of our discussions breaks their hold on us... for if 'thought' – broad and all-embracing – is not *their* exclusive province... then their sense of themselves is shaken... their entire 'philosophy' mistaken...

...and as we free ourselves... we un-make them... “command exists but with obedience...”

[“151025theindividualprogressofeach.mp3”:]

[Today's reading: continuing our interlude: Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*... before returning to the chapter "Poisonous Pedagogy" in Alice Miller's *For Your Own Good*...]

[And let's take in what Popper just said... that what these 'power'-mad folk did... was to lie to their children (as they were once lied to...) As they were inculcated with Plato's philosophy... it wasn't presented to 'their children' (who extend beyond their biological children...) as propaganda that was created to cement their rule in place... no... it was presented to them as real... as actual... that they were *actually* in possession of a 'higher dialectical knowledge'... that the rest of the populace could not understand... they were actually taught to believe that – this is why I say they cannot be reasoned with... it is so deeply embedded in their psyches... this notion that they are superior beings – but it is irrelevant because it's such a tiny number of folks... but they have amassed massive means... because they have been planning... they work together – it shows the power of working together: it's our turn now... now that we see that con... see the game... see their deep psychological disturbance... so that there's no mystery why the earth is in such trouble right now... why there's been such massive genocide and destruction of the planet... there's really no mystery about it once we understand there's conscious planning behind it: they deeply have contempt for their Brothers and Sisters... to say the least.]

[We are reading excerpts from Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*... and Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789 – 1914*, in order to see the origins of the 'modern' 'centralist' bureaucratic nation-state in the fixed determination of 'statesmen' to repress us... we-the-people... It is a new invention... the 'nation-state'... with no less devastating effects for being so. And so long as it lasts... it – these global-'statesmen' – will forestall our growth... our right to express our infinite expansiveness... It's important that we get clear... as we design our education work with the broader community... on this notion of 'progress'... given that it is their core propaganda: it's the 'power'-guys *raison d'être* and self-justification. Let's keep in mind Kropotkin's carefully thought-through (his life-long practice of carefully thinking-through...) analysis – I encourage folks to download the Kropotkin pdf I'm posting to the 'Blog' page (the draft number changes as I correct errors and add more of his text...) Recall he said (and this shows – the whole essay from which this was excerpted... “Modern Science and Anarchism”... shows – that he was very much attuned to the propaganda they would use to control us: the two principle ones being Bentham's “greatest happiness principle”... and the “‘power’ delivers 'progress’ ideology – and that he was attuned as well to there being a possible tool here in the U.S in our right as a people to pursue happiness...):

We seek progress in the fullest emancipation of the individual from the authority of the State; in the greatest development of individual initiative and in the limitation of all the governmental functions, but surely not in their extension. The march forward in political institutions appears to us to consist in abolishing in the first place the State authority which has fixed itself upon society and which now tries to extend its functions more and more; and in the second place, in allowing the broadest possible development for the principle of free agreement, and in acknowledging the independence of all possible associations formed for definite ends, embracing in their federations the whole of society. The life of society itself we understand, not as something complete and rigid, but as something never perfect – something ever striving for new forms, and ever changing these forms in accordance with the needs of time. This is what *life* is in nature.

Such a conception of human progress and of what we think desirable in the future (what, in our opinion, can increase the sum of happiness) leads us inevitably to our own special tactics in the struggle. It induces us to strive for the greatest possible development of personal initiative in every individual and group, and to secure unity of action, not through discipline, but through the unity of aims and the mutual confidence which never fail to develop when a great number of persons have consciously embraced some common idea.

Let's think more about the implications of Kropotkin's words [for our discussion next week] for the physical design of our new world based on non-coercion and the full development of our gifts. As we think more about them I believe its truth will become obvious (as well as why the 'power'-mad use the tactic of 'infiltration'... to destroy our mutual confidence...) On the individual progress of each... as a broad social endowment... depends progress overall. There is no 'progress' unless there is the self-development of our gifts as individuals... which cannot happen while the state is sucking on them... sitting on them... on us... It's been a hundred-years-plus since we were given these words by Kropotkin... and the Left has been missing in action and intentionally suppressed... it's time for each one of us to assume the leadership... – P.S.].

[“151025cloakofliberalism.mp3”:]

“The Liberal State and Class Conflict, 1830 – 1875”, Chapter 3 in Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789 – 1914...* (page 77 – 141)

During the first half of the nineteenth century, socialism as a concept was still not separate from “bourgeois democracy” as a concept or, as Labrousse (1949b, 7) says, “Jacobinism and socialism remained muddled in political life.” In some sense, it probably remained for at least a century thereafter that a full distinction of the two concepts did not exist. Nonetheless, liberalism (which seems to me a better locution than “bourgeois democracy”) and socialism began to have diverging trajectories as political options after 1830. Indeed, as Hobsbawm (1962, 284) argues:

Practical liberals... shied away from political democracy... The social discontents, revolutionary movements, and the socialist ideologues of the post-Napoleonic era intensified this dilemma [of relying upon the majority to carry out the dictates of reason] [...and there... embedded in that off-hand remark... is the core... key... almost originating propaganda piece of 'class': that you cannot rely on the majority to deliver a society that is optimal for everyone... that only a tiny few who are in possession of the philosophical wisdom of Plato can do that for us... – P.S.] and the 1830 Revolution made it acute. Liberalism and democracy appeared to be adversaries rather than allies.

[Before continuing it would be helpful to understand clearly what Wallerstein means by 'liberalism.' The following quote from the opening chapter (p. 5 - 6) of this book by Wallerstein should help clarify how he is using the term 'liberal'... and 'liberalism' – which... I'm encouraging us to consider... refers to a new strategy and tactics... invented post French-Revolution... by folks with a Plato-allegiance... determined to supplant the old aristocrats... because they believed they had a better plan... to suppress us... we-the-people:

“Liberalism started ideological life on the left of the political spectrum, or at least on the center-left. [From the little I've digested thus far from this book by Wallerstein... he uses 'liberals' as I use 'Plato's Tribesmen'... the 'power'-guys... post-French Revolution... We shall have to consider whether that comparison is accurate as we go along... but if there is any correspondence at all... to apply the term 'left' to these guys... in any sense of the word... from where I sit... invalidates it... and 'left ideology' is a concept specific to 'bourgeois democracy'... as... under 'class'... there has never been a time when we-the-people did not produce 'ideologies' of freedom... – P.S.] Liberalism defined itself as the opposite of conservatism [and by 'conservatism' he means I assume attachment to the old aristocratic privileges and values... – P.S.], on the basis of what might be called a “consciousness of being modern” (Minogue, 1963, 3). Liberalism proclaimed itself universalist. Sure of themselves and of the truth of this new world-view of

modernity, liberals sought to propagate their views and intrude the logic of their views within all social institutions [and that of course is the definition of totalitarianism – and why... my whole life... has that never been said – out loud – so we can start discussing it?... as well as the fact that they have succeeded in their ambition... thanks to the poisoned pedagogues that Alice discusses... and the use of war to slaughter the opposition and beat us into submission... – P.S.], [...intrude their views into all social institutions...] thereby ridding the world of the “irrational” leftovers of the past. To do this, they had to fight conservative ideologues, whom they saw as obsessed with fear of “free men” – men liberated from the false idols of tradition. [This sugary spin is their originating propaganda... their 'origin myth' and self-justification... – P.S.]

“Liberals believed, however, that progress, even though it was inevitable, could not be achieved without some human effort, without a political program. [And here we give thanks again for Popper's explanation of 'historicism' – “story leading reality” – and how it keys into their belief in totalitarian social engineering... – P.S.] Liberal ideology was thus the belief that, in order for history [i.e. in order for the thoughts in their head to live... – P.S.] to follow its natural course, it was necessary to engage in conscious, continual, intelligent reformism, in full awareness that “time was the universal friend, which would inevitably bring greater happiness to ever greater numbers” (Schapiro, 1949, 13). [Straight-up Hegel (on 'History' and collateral misery) and Bentham of course (his 'greatest happiness' principle...) who at least was honest... but these guys can absolutely not be taken at their word – not these guys... with their 'lordly lies' and their training as infants to keep secrets. Secrecy is their watchword... hiding their m.o.... public presentation necessarily the dissemination of propaganda... – P.S.]

[“151025optimaltotalitarianism.mp3”:]

“...To be sure, the center is merely an abstraction, and a rhetorical device. One can always locate oneself in central position simply by defining the extremes as one wishes. Liberals are those who decided to do this as their basic political strategy. [I.e.... they decided it was time... to employ a 'lordly lie'... – P.S.] Faced with the normality of change, liberals would claim a position between the conservatives – that is, the right, who wanted to slow down the pace of normal change as much as possible – and the “democrats” (or radicals or socialists or revolutionaries) – that is, the left, who wanted to speed it up as much as possible. [And how is the ideology that we-the-people must have 'Reason' imposed on us... and... that 'reality' must be so constructed as to *force* us to 'progress'... anything but totalitarian? – P.S.] In short, liberals were those who wished to control the pace of change so that it occurred at what they considered to be an optimal speed. But could one really know what is the optimal speed? Yes, said the liberals, and their metastrategy was precisely geared to achieving this end.” (p. 5 - 6)

[What I want to know is... what happened to the language 'world bourgeoisie'... 'world elite'... 'world right'... the “managers of the status quo...” of *Antisystemic Movements* – true... he uses 'world right' in his chapter of *Does Capitalism Have A Future?...* which is more straight-forward... and states their totalitarian ambition more baldly... perhaps we will discover the answer in the course of our reading...

[“151025totalitarianstrategy.mp3”:]

[Returning to Chapter 3... “The Liberal State and Class Conflict, 1830 – 1875”... – P.S.]:

The concept of class and class conflict was not a contribution of socialist ideologues, much less of Karl Marx. It is a Saint-Simonian idea, developed and pursued by Guizot as part of the liberal project. Saint-Simon's view of the class structure in the modern industrial world was that there were *three* classes: the property owners, the propertyless, and the savants [It seems to me a clear debt here to Plato... – P.S.]. He saw the class conflict between the “industrials” (those who work) and the idlers as a transitional phase, to be superseded by a harmonious society [...and another debt here... to Bentham... as well as to Plato... – P.S.] of productive industrial classes under the aegis of the savants [...the 'philosopher-kings'... – P.S.], a meritocratic vision in which the old aristocracy of birth would be replaced by an aristocracy of talent (Manuel, 1956; Iggers, 1958b). For Guizot, the concept of class was an essential element in his efforts to “legitimate the political aspirations of the bourgeoisie” (Fossert, 1955, 60).

But in 1830, Guizot and his friends succeeded, as they were simultaneously succeeding in Great Britain, in establishing a form of middle-class rule “as a permanent *juste milieu* or golden mean between the extremes of revolution and reaction” (Starzinger, 1965, viii). The Chamber of Deputies on August 7, 1830, suppressed the Preamble to the Charter of 1814 “as wounding the national dignity by appearing to *grant* to Frenchmen rights which belong to them essentially” [That's the kind of sleazy underhanded move that the 'power'-guys of today have learned to polish smooth... – P.S.] (Collins, 1970, 90). The liberals politically and the *grande bourgeoisie* socially had at last won their *droit de cite*. [Wallerstein's note

(partially) reads: “Both L'homme (1960, 36) and Pouthas (1962, 258) speak of the substitution of one class for the other as the dominant force...” [Except... these guys don't just want to be kings... what they lust for is divinity... and Guizot et all-the-rest-of-his-fellow-Tribesmen had hit upon a strategy that... down the road... would bring them to that first step... on the throne. Albert O. Hirschman ties Guizot's proclamation “Enrichissez-vous!” as a model of conduct for the citizen...” (p. 122) to this calculation: “...those who observed money-making activities from a distance and with some disdain... [nonetheless derived comfort from the thought that when] the 'lower orders,' or the 'great mob of mankind,' have only interests to pursue [they] have little time or taste for the passions [revolution] (p. 125, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph*.)” He makes the case effectively... and what Wallerstein documents here backs him up... that 'accumulation' was encouraged intentionally by “the few who play for the higher stakes of power” as a conscious strategy to keep 'the mob' too busy simply surviving to bother 'their betters' with thoughts of getting free... This is old strategy... but... once... with the help of Plato's propaganda-playbook – his political strategy handbook – the *Republic*... once a small but very organized group decided to orient the whole of society around it... they altered decisively... to their advantage... the terms of engagement with we-the-people... i.e.... it became something different when resurrected as a totalitarian vision... – P.S.]

[“151025platoupdated.mp3”:]

Since, in addition, this coincided with a period of accelerating economic and social change, the most urgent problems facing France and Great Britain had now become the “social problems” of industrialism, and especially those of the “new proletariat, the horrors of uncontrolled break-neck urbanization” (Hobsbawm, 1962, 207). Class conflict would therefore come to mean something different from what Saint-Simon and Guizot had had in mind. The Revolution of 1830 itself came at a moment of particular economic difficulty for the workers (high unemployment, unusually high wheat prices). It provided evidence of the utility of political uprising and served to stimulate workers' consciousness, a sense of having common interest “solely as proletarians,” a sense of the “dignity of the worker” (Festy, 1908, 330). The liberals perceived this change immediately. Thiers said in a statement to the Chamber of Deputies: “The day after the Revolution of July, we saw our duty to moderate it. In effect it was no longer liberty, but order which was in danger” (cited in Bezucha, 1974, 137).

The next few years were to see worker unrest of a new intensity and quality in both France and Great Britain. It has been increasingly noted in the literature on strikes and workers' unrest how much of this activity was that of “artisans” as opposed to “workers.” Although the line is not always as clear as some seem to think, in general those referred to as “artisans” had more technical skills, higher real income, and more workplace autonomy than other kinds of workers. Many of these “artisans” were members of organizations that had been in existence long before the nineteenth century, and which functioned to advance the welfare of their members through social support and mutual help. The organizations were hierarchical and built around rituals.

These organizations were the only ones permitted at all in the periods when trade-union organization had been strictly forbidden, and then only under the careful surveillance of the authorities. In the changing political situation after 1830, however, even mutual aid societies began to take on new roles, as See (1951, 2:199) pointed out: “Many of these societies served... to hide veritable *resistance organizations*, hostile to the employers; by creating *auxiliary monetary reserves* (*bourses auxiliaires*), they created funds to support the unemployed and strikers.” Thus it could be, as Stearns (1965, 371 – 372) has argued, that such “artisans” were more likely to engage in strike action at this time than the “factory workers,” who, being in an even weaker position, were “almost totally quiescent.” [While Wallerstein – in his use of quotation marks with the 'class' designations – acknowledges the fluidity of the categories into which we are put... for ease of analysis in Academe... and to facilitate 'power's planning... The critique in this space goes further. You recall during the September 27, 2015 show... my comment that 'class' categorizations have no valid use for us... exist... rather... to serve 'power's ideological purposes... So when we note... the hierarchical ordering systematically promulgated... imposed... by these totalitarian social engineers in Plato's mold... we shouldn't forget what Plato said to 'rule' of his day and beyond... 'if you want to “win”... then... the gulf must be widened... between the “rulers” and the “ruled”... “the stronger the feeling that the ruled are a different and altogether inferior race, the stronger will be the sense of unity among the rulers. We arrive in this way at the fundamental principle, announced only [by Plato] after some hesitation, that there must be no mingling between the classes...” (Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato*, p. 48 – 9). That it is Plato-updated that imbues these self-proclaimed 'liberals' with such self-righteous fervor and conviction I think there is no doubt... and we should note as well (as we have before) that when we agree to self-limit ourselves by keeping to the narrow categories imposed by self-appointed global-'rulers'... it means the atrophy of 'thought' itself. What a bunch of nut-cases 'rule' our world... these 'power'-mad few... simply because they have amassed the means to impose on us their sick world-view... It's time (long past...) for us to amass our 'means' too... – P.S.]

[October 25, 2015 show ends here.]

The distinction made by many scholars between artisans and factory workers seems to be asserted primarily on the basis of differing workplace organization. But in fact the artisans were usually in “workshops,” which were not all that different in structure and even social organization from the rather small “factories” that existed in this era. I suspect the real difference was in the social origins of the two groups of workers. The “artisans” were males, and males who came for the most part from the immediate area. The “factory workers” were largely either women and children (Bezucha, 1974, 35) or “migrants,” which included both those who came from rural communities and workers speaking another language.

The most dramatic expression of protest by the “artisans” was that of the *canuts* of Lyon, first in 1831 and then in 1834. The struggles began right after the July Revolution, and included machine destruction and eviction of “foreign” workers. The background to this was an eighteenth-century militancy of journeymen, which had erupted in 1786 in the so-called tuppenny riot (*emeute de deux sous*), in which the journeymen sought to obtain a fixed minimum rate for finished cloth. The ongoing turmoil continued up to the French Revolution and the enactment of the *Loi Le Chapelier*. Bezucha (1974, 46) concludes that “the French Revolution, in fact, broke the momentum created prior to 1789 and may have retarded the development of a workers' movement in Lyon.” In the years between 1789 and 1830, however, the relatively stable system of the *compagnon* had been replaced by a more “fluid one of piece-work laborers” (Bezucha, 1974, 46)

Levasseur (1904, 2:6) asks the questions, Why Lyon? Why 1831? His answer is that Lyon was living off a luxury industry, silk, which made it more “sensitive... to economic crises and political turmoil.” The immediate issue, as in 1786, was a minimum wage, which had been agreed to by the prefect but subsequently revoked by the central government. The first strike was relatively nonpolitical. But discontent continued. There was a strike in Paris in 1832. The atmosphere was more and more politicized, partly by the dissatisfaction of the working classes with the politics of the July Monarchy, partly (at least in Lyon) by the agitation of the Italian nationalist forces. Mazzini's aide-de-camp, General Romorino, was often in Lyon recruiting persons for their attempts to liberate Savoy and Piedmont (Bezucha, 1974, 122). On February 14, 1834, a general strike was called. It did not succeed. The local Republican party was divided in its attitude. A repressive law caused a further reaction by the workers in April, an uprising in which some three hundred were killed. This attempt came to be viewed as a “landmark in the history of the European working class” (Bezucha, 1974, 124). This time the repression by the authorities was definitive. There was a “monster trial” in 1835, which the government used “to get rid of the republicans.” Faced with the beginnings of a serious class struggle by the urban working class, the liberal state initially reacted as repressively as did its predecessors.

The story was not very different in Great Britain. The moral equivalent of the July Revolution was the Reform Bill of 1832. Great Britain did not know “three glorious days” of “revolution.” Instead, there was a parliamentary battle in which the revolution was “voted” in, on the crucial second reading in 1831, by a single vote.

When, despite this, the bill was defeated in committee. Parliament was dissolved, and a pro-reform Parliament elected. At the time there was great awareness of events in France, and the possibilities of “worse” happening. Macaulay's speech on March 2, 1831, in favor of reform makes clear the reasoning of those who advocated it:

Turn where we may, within, around, the voice of great events is proclaiming to us, Reform, that you may preserve... Renew the youth of the State. Save property divided against itself. Save the multitude, endangered by its own ungovernable passions. Save the aristocracy, endangered by its own unpopular power. Save the greatest, and fairest, and most highly civilised country that ever existed, from calamities that may in a few days sweep away all the rich heritage of so many ages of wisdom and glory. The danger is terrible. The time is short. If this Bill should be rejected, I pray to God that none of those who concur in rejecting it ever remember their votes with unavailing remorse, amidst the wreck of laws, the confusion of ranks, the spoliation of property, and the dissolution of social orders.

Macaulay's argument was heard. And, exactly as in France, once the middle strata had won their *droit de cite*, attention turned immediately to containing the claims of the working classes. Chartism, “much the most important movement of working men” (Evans, 1983, 215) and a continuation of the old radical reform movement, was contemporaneous with and strongest during the great industrial depression from 1837 to 1843. It gained considerable notoriety and seemed a real menace to the authorities for several years. A large part of Chartist ranks were drawn from members of trade societies. But it also had support from middle-class radicals (Rowe, 1967, 85). The Chartist movement existed simultaneously with, and was in direct rivalry with, the free-trade movement of the Anti-Corn Law League. Halevy (1947, 9) raises the specter of a potential for “civil war.” Briggs (1959, 312) speaks of the two movements as representing “a contrast between two segments of a divided society.” Gash (1965, 2) says of the “Movement” (“a phrase borrowed from Continental politics”) that it “had an undeniable air of class war....”

...The internal problems of Great Britain and France never became large enough that those powers could not concentrate attention on the geopolitics of the world-system. The July Revolution, repeated and confirmed by the independence of Belgium and the Reform Act of 1832, was to have an immediate effect on Europe. Whereas the relations of Great Britain and France between 1815 and 1830 had been correct, and those countries often found themselves on similar sides of world issues, the heritage of the two-century struggle for hegemony continued to ensure enough mutual suspicion to preserve a degree of distance. The July Revolution overcame that, affecting even the Tory government of Wellington before the Reform Bill was enacted Europe now entered the era of the *entente cordiale*, a marriage perhaps not of love but certainly of reason, one that would survive all subsequent quarrels until at least 1945. The term itself was probably coined by Palmerston in 1831, although it did not come into official use until 1842 (Guyot, 1926, 220; Halevy, 1950, 3:73, n. 1). The geopolitical basis of the alliance was clear, "As a Liberal power, France was [after the July Revolution] in the nature of things the ally of Liberal England" (Halevy, 1950, 3:73). Great Britain could now pursue with greater ease its containment of absolutism in Europe and expand the circle of liberal states (Guyot, 1926, 88, 117)

But there were further motives. Great Britain and France faced the same internal problems, and even if France was not yet ready to embrace the free-trade nostrums of Great Britain, the *entente cordiale* seemed "in the eyes of democrats and socialists" as an "alliance of capitals" that was a "*fait accompli*" (Guyot, 1926, 302). Was this so wrong? Indeed, the two effects were not separate. In pressuring other powers to follow their example, Great Britain and France, with the *entente cordiale*, "discouraged the international revolutionary propaganda which counted on the divisions among the powers" (Guichen, 1917, 424 – 425).

Furthermore, 1830 launched a pattern that would discourage such propaganda even further. For France at least, 1830 served to restore France to a sense of world centrality and nationalist pride. It was not Guizot but the French socialist Louis Blanc (1844, 4:143 – 144) who would write:

The July Revolution... was more than the *denouement* of a struggle against the Church and royalty; it was the expression of national sentiment that had been excessively repressed by the treaties of 1815. We were determined to shake off the yoke of these treaties and restore the European equilibrium.

One of the curious facts to note about the July Revolution was what happened in Algeria. Charles X's launching of the imperial venture had made Great Britain most unhappy, and Louis XVIII was ready to sacrifice it to appease the British. When, however, the French restrained themselves from direct intervention in Belgium, they felt they had done their share of pleasing the British, and simply continued the occupation, this time without British protest. One reason clearly was its effect on worker unrest within France. The "floating" population of Paris, the potential revolutionaries, were being encouraged to settle in Algeria. Indeed, in 1838 Leon Blondel, a high civil servant in Algeria, could say with some confidence: "Africa is an element of order in France" (cited in Tudesq, 1964, 2:815).

The liberal states thus combined legitimating the political role of the middle classes (and thereby receiving from them legitimation in turn) and internal repression of working-class discontent with an *entente cordiale* between themselves to ensure their dominance in the geopolitical arena. This seemed to work at first. But it was fragile, as the European revolution of 1848 was to demonstrate. More would have to be done to secure a stable political framework for the capitalist world-economy in the post-1789 situation. [And... again... as Hirschman suggests... a lot of megalomaniacal scheming can be hidden 'neath the ideology of 'an economy' that never stops eating... because of some supposed 'inherent logic of accumulation'... – P.S.]

...The conservatism of the French regime contrasted with what was happening in the other liberal states. A liberal pope, Pius IX, had been elected in 1846, to the dismay of Metternich (Bury, 1948, 425). If Belgium remained "calm" in 1848, "it was because it had made its revolution, peacefully, in 1847. (Dhondt, 1949, 124) Similarly, the liberals and radicals had won their internal struggle against the Sonderbund in Switzerland in 1847, with the diplomatic support of the British but amid French hesitation (Halperin, 1948, 1:157). Indeed, this was a moment of temporary breakdown of the *entente cordiale*. At home, the British had handled well the chartist challenge at the same time that Sir Robert Peel was steering through the Repeal of the Corn Laws ["Materially the repeal of the Corn Laws would protect the poorer classes in time of scarcity against any disastrous rise in food prices. Morally, it gave them assurances that, unfranchised though most of them were, their welfare was an object of concern to an aristocratic Government and Parliament" (Gash, 1977, 97)], such that the "specter of Communism" passed them by as well. The crisis of 1847 "provoked no revolutionary disturbance" (Halevy, 1947, 181), although the Irish had to pay the price for this [the Irish potato famine occurred just at the time of the debate on the Corn Laws... that the Irish famine became a ploy in the intra-Conservative political game is

clear from Clark's account of repeal: "The traditional remedy for famine was to suspend the Corn Laws and open the ports. But Peel told his Cabinet that if he did this (in the case of Ireland at this time) he could not promise to reimpose them, and a majority in the Cabinet felt they could not support him in this policy on these terms. He therefore retired, but the Whigs could not, or would not, form a government. Peel therefore returned to office at the Queen's request (and repealed the Corn Laws himself.)"]

Nonetheless, the weakening of the liberal project in France, one of the two pillar states, provided enough tinder for the revolutionary flame to be ignited throughout the nonliberal [meaning "non-'bourgeois'"] parts of Europe. To be sure, Metternich and the Austrians blamed the British, accused of being too liberal, for the uprisings, but the blame is more legitimately placed at the feet of the French, who got cold feet and were not liberal enough. John Stuart Mill (1849, 7) was very severe on Louis-Philippe in assessing the causes of the February 1848 uprising in Paris, which was the beginning of the 1848 European revolutions:

No government can now expect to be permanent unless it guarantees progress as well as order; nor can it continue really to secure order, unless it promotes progress. [It certainly seems the global-state-statesmen have taken this advice to heart... although modified to say: "*seem* to guarantee 'progress'..." that message is drummed into all school-children and every other 'class'-bound human... across the globe – an associated set of messages actually: "not everyone is smart..." "the system identifies and rewards the 'smart ones'..." "the 'really smart' are busy making our lives easier..." "the system works hard to provide you with 'the good life' but you must do your part too... and keep your skills marketable... because 'science' is developing so fast... if you don't you could fall through the cracks (and of course that would be *your* fault..." – these are just a few of 'the system's key messages about 'progress'... – P.S.] It can go on as yet, with only a little of the spirit of improvement; while reformers have even a remote hope of effecting their objects through the existing system, they are generally willing to bear with it. But when there is no hope at all; when the institutions themselves seem to oppose an unyielding barrier to the program of improvement, the advance of tide heaps itself up behind them till it bears them down.

The tide – that is, the European revolution of 1848 – as all such great happenings, was made up of a mixture of movements and objectives. In France, it consisted essentially of the joining together of Europe's 'first great proletarian insurrection' (Tilly, 1971, 228) with the acute discontent of the left liberals who shared John Stuart Mill's view of the conservatization of the July Monarchy. Elsewhere in Europe, instates that were not as yet committed to liberalism, there were no proletarian insurrections; rather, there were liberal uprisings combined with nationalist uprisings. Two situations, with two solutions: Louis Napoleon handled the first; Palmerston, the rest.

The uprising of February 1848 illuminated the hopes of a 'social republic,' a vague socialist utopia that would provide jobs to the unemployed and liberation to all those who suffered indignities and inequalities. Everyone put forward their claims: the "artisans," who sought to restore their privileges and their mode of production; the peasants, who sought to reestablish traditional rights of collective usage; the women, who sought the extension of "universal" suffrage to include them; the slaves, who sought abolition. The pendulum was beginning to swing too far, and in June the forces of order under General Cavaignac reined in the unruly dangerous classes. "Pitiful provisional government!" cried Labrousse (1948,2) "It feared the social revolution as much as it did the counter-revolution."

Cavaignac could repress; he could not relegitimize the state. Nor could the monarchs return; they had exhausted their credit. Into this void stepped Louis Napoleon, who sought to re-create a liberal, orderly, modern state and who, as Zeldin (1958, 6) puts it so well, "was not elected because he was [the] candidate [of the Party of Order], but... was their candidate because they saw he was bound to win." But what did Louis Napoleon represent? He represented, first of all, the Napoleonic tradition, which combined the legacy of the French Revolution, a commitment to scientific and industrial progress, and nationalism. During the 1840s, Louis Napoleon had been a sharp critic of the July Monarchy because he felt that, by distancing itself from progressive liberalism, it was "building on sand and would surely tumble." And, unlike Guizot, he was aware that "with proper safeguards a democratic regime could be established without threatening the stability of the country."

The liberals acted in 1848 just as they had in 1830. Dismayed by a regime that had become too rigid, too illiberal, they rose up and quickly won the day. Then, dismayed by the possibility that the lower strata would be able to take advantage of the situation and push things too far, they renewed their links with the political groups they had just ousted from power, because 'the enemy, at present, is on the left' (Palmade, 1961, 255). When Louis Napoleon made his coup d'etat

on December 2, 1851, the primary objective was to repress the left. The secondary objective was, however, to constrain the ability of conservative forces to act other than through him. One can, if one wants, emphasize the Caesarist – the so-called Bonapartist – element in the regime. If one does, however, one risks missing the degree to which the outcome of the repression, which was both real and effective, was that of a centrist regime, oriented to capitalist expansion, constructing a liberal compromise – one led not by a classical liberal but by an enlightened conservative.” (Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789 – 1914*, p. 77 – 92)

[Returning now to the conclusion of *The Eighteenth Brumaire...* – P.S.]

Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another. Just as at the time of the Fronde it was said of the Duke of Guise that he was the most *obligent* man in France because he had turned all his estates into his partisans' obligations to him, so Bonaparte would fain be the most *obligent* man in France and turn all the property, all the labour of France into a personal obligation to himself. He would like to steal the whole of France in order to be able to make a present of her to France or, rather, in order to be able to buy France anew with French money, for as the chief of the Society of December 10 he must needs buy what ought to belong to him. And all the state institutions, the Senate, the Council of State, the legislative body, the Legion of Honour, the soldiers' medals, the washhouses, the public works, the railways, the *etat major* [General Staff] of the National Guard to the exclusion of privates, and the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans – all become parts of the institution of purchase. Every place in the army and in the government machine becomes a means of purchase. But the most important feature of this process, whereby France is taken in order to give to her, is the percentages that find their way into the pockets of the head and the members of the Society of December 10 during the turnover. The witticism with which Countess L., the mistress of M. de Morny, characterized the confiscation of the Orleans estates: “*C'est le premier vol de l'aigle*” [“It is the first flight (theft) of the eagle”] is applicable to every flight of this *eagle*, which is more like a *raven* [I resent that! The raven is most regal... – P.S.]. He himself and his adherents call out to one another daily like that Italian Carthusian admonishing the miser who, with boastful display, counted up the goods on which he could yet live for years to come: “*Tu fai conto sopra i beni, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni.*” [“Thou countest thy goods, thou shouldst first count thy years.”] Lest they make a mistake in the years, they count the minutes. A bunch of blokes push their way forward to the court, into the ministries, to the head of the administration and the army, a crowd of the best of whom it must be said that no one knows whence he comes, a noisy, disreputable, rapacious bohème that crawls into gallooned coats with the same grotesque dignity as the high dignitaries of Soulouque. One can visualize clearly this upper stratum of the Society of December 10, if one reflects that *Veron-Crevel* [In his work, *Cousine Bette*, Balzac delineates the thoroughly dissolute Parisian philistine in Crevel, a character which he draws after the model of Dr. Veron, the proprietor of the *Constitutionnel* ('a French bourgeois daily')] is its preacher of morals and *Granier de Cassagnac* its thinker. When Guizot, at the time of his ministry, utilized this Granier on a hole-and-corner newspaper against the dynastic opposition, he used to boast of him with the quip: “*C'est le roi des droles*,” “he is the king of buffoons.” One would do wrong to recall the Regency or Louis XV in connection with Louis Bonaparte's court and clique. For “often already, France has experienced a government of *homme entretenus*” [kept men].

Driven by the contradictory demands of his situation and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on himself, as Napoleon's substitute, by springing constant surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a *coup d'etat en miniature* every day, Bonaparte throws the entire bourgeois economy into confusion, violates everything that seemed inviolable to the Revolution of 1848, makes some tolerant of revolution, others desirous of revolution, and produces actual anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time stripping its halo from the entire state machine, profanes it and makes it at once loathsome and ridiculous. The cult of the Holy Tunic of Treves [“a Catholic relic preserved in the Treves Cathedral, alleged to be a holy vestment taken from Christ while he was suffering death. It was regarded by pilgrims as an object of veneration.”] he duplicates at Paris in the cult of the Napoleonic imperial mantle. But when the imperial mantle finally falls on the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the bronze statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendome Column. (Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, p. 133 – 135)

[Because our – that is... we-the-people's – understanding of 'historical' events is generally through the lens of the 'educational system' of (premised on) 'class'... designed to reinforce the 'logic' of 'rule' (consciously or unconsciously...) which 'logic'... we are now seeing... is embedded in the utilitarian mindset (and vice versa...) a.k.a. 'dualism'... on which 'thought' itself is premised – under 'class' – how do we 'make' authentic 'sense' of the blow-by-blow 'class'-sanctioned ('system'-stamped-legitimate) historical descriptions we are given?

What does this 'history' *mean*... for us?... what are we to make of it?

Let's return to this question after considering the broader world-systems context provided by Immanuel Wallerstein – this will be his view further into the same chapter (“The Liberal State and Class Conflict”) we've been excerpting. Two things stand out... one: “the supremacy game” the 'power'-guys are engaged in with each other... experimenting with their new toy... the 'powerful'... bureaucratic... nation-state – and two: their self-creation as 'global-state-statesmen'... with a common vision and purpose... inventing... as the key structural means for accomplishing this... an interstate 'mechanism' to ensure our – that is... we-the-people's – suppression... A question we should ask ourselves... I think... is... why... even in the analyses of those who have our interests in mind... these obvious motives of 'power' are not the starting point of these analyses – as they are for Kropotkin – and why... rather... our advocates help legitimate... and obscure... these unmistakable motives by employing the ideology of 'economic development'? Wherever we stand on this issue... there needs to be discussion... – P.S.]:

The 1850s marked the high point of growth in British exports. The export of cotton piece goods “just about doubled” in the decade, actually increasing even the *rate* of growth, which, Hobsbawm argues (1975, 30 – 31), provided “invaluable [political] breathing-space.” Cotton textiles were still central to British wealth, but this was the period in which metals and machinery moved to the fore as the leading industry, and with them the emergence of “bigger industrial units all along the line” (Clapham, 1932, 2:114). Great Britain was clearly on the road to becoming an industrial state. “The course was set” (Clapham, 1932, 2:22). For Great Britain, these were “buoyant years,” in which her economic dominance of the world-economy went “virtually unchallenged” and in which the new world of industry “seemed less like a volcano and more like a cornucopia (Coleman, 1973, 7 – 8). Great Britain was comfortably hegemonic, but also complacently so, not always feeling she had to watch over every fluctuation of the world-economy.

Yet, we should not exaggerate. The voyage was “not half over.” Agriculture remained “by very far the greatest of [Great Britain's] industries” (Clapham, 1932, 2:22). Church (1975, 76) believes that calling this period the “mid-Victorian boom” must be severely qualified.” Yes, there was a price rise, business expansion, and an improved standard of living, but the growth rate in production was not all that big, and 1858 saw the most profound downward business cycle of the century. Like all economic leaders, Great Britain was preparing its own fall. It was resistant to innovation. It was in 1856 that Bessemer first read his paper on his use of air blasts to make quality steel more inexpensively, but his ideas would not be widely adopted until the Kondratieff B-phase. The expansion of the world-economy was bringing in its wake further industrialization in the United States and various parts of Europe, making Great Britain's competitive position “steadily more difficult,” particularly because these countries indicated, with the significant exception of France, that they had “no intention of following Britain's example” in adopting free trade (Schlote, 1952, 43). Indeed, Great Britain itself would eventually sour on free trade.

In this midcentury British glow, France seemed initially at a disadvantage because of the turmoil of 1848. Once again, its revolutions seemed to be hurting its economic development. But this time only most briefly, because the political solution to the turmoil – the populist authoritarianism of the Second Empire – served to resolve some of the political tensions precisely because this regime had made itself, as none had done before, the proponent and propellant of a leap forward of French economic structures, thereby consolidating the liberal core of the world system.

The economic indicators were clear: Foreign trade tripled (Palmade, 1961, 193). The production of the means of production grew relative to the production of consumable goods (Markovitch, 1966, 322). There was a boom not only in domestic investment but also in foreign investment, such that by 1867 net income from external investments exceeded net export of capital. For Cameron (1961, 79), this meant that France had become “a 'mature' creditor nation.” And French public finances had become, along with those of Great Britain, “solid.” The public subscription to government loans “demonstrated the strength of savings and the abundance of capital which existed in the *two* countries” (Gille, 1967, 280). In short, this was a time of economic glory for France as well as for Great Britain. This was “to the benefit, if not the credit, of the Second Empire,” but, as Palmade (1961, 127, 129) insists, “the externally favorable situation fell to a government firmly committed to taking advantage of it.”

Furthermore, it was a government that thought governmental action was essential to this economic expansion, one that did not consider, in the words of Napoleon III [Louis Bonaparte], that state action was a “necessary ulcer” but rather that it was “the benevolent motor of any social organism.” The intention nonetheless was to promote private enterprise thereby. Although the “primary concern” of the government was to “create as many [economic] activities as possible,” still the government wished to “avoid this grievous tendency of the state to engage in activities which private individuals can do as well as or better than it can.” Furthermore, the public works program of the government was directed not merely to aid industry, but to shore up the agricultural sector. And behind this practice – “a precursor of technocratic Gaullist

modernization” – was the objective of combating “political instability and class conflict (Magraw, 1985, 159), crucial for a regime that had emerged in the crucible of the Revolution of 1848.

This is where the famous Saint-Simonian link comes in. Actually, we should talk of the post-Saint-Simonians, those who had emerged out of the pseudoreligious phase under Enfantin and who retained only the “radical” spirit of Saint-Simon – rigorously modernist, technocratic, reformist, ultimately neither “socialist” nor “conservative” (as some have claimed) but essentially “liberal” in spirit, as became most clear in the Second Empire. It was liberal in spirit because it combined the two key features of liberalism: economic development linked to social amelioration. [And by ‘social amelioration’... recall... he’s referring to the continuous provision of ‘progress’ to ‘the people’... and the maintenance of ‘order’ – i.e. a ‘social contract’ dependent on being able to rape the earth elsewhere... i.e.... dependent on ‘the colonies’... – P.S.] For liberals, the two are obverse [“corresponding to something else as its opposite or counterpart...” I would say that one implies the other... – P.S.] sides of the same coin. The Saint-Simonians affirmed “the primacy of the economic over the political sphere” (Blanchard, 1956, 60). But they also argued, in the 1831 formula of Isaac Pereire, that economic progress would bring about “an amelioration of the lot of the largest and poorest strata” (cited in Plessis, 1973, 86). This is of course why Napoleon III and the Saint-Simonians were “made for each other” (Weill, 1913, 391 – 92). To be sure, the Saint-Simonians were “about the only intellectual group available to [Napoleon]” (Boon, 1936, 85). But also vice versa: the modernist sector of the bourgeoisie, the true liberals, “needed [Napoleon] to liberate themselves from the timidities of the well-to-do” (Aguilhon, 1973, 234), who had dominated the Party of Order in the July Monarchy. This is why Guerard (1943, chap. 9) called Napoleon III “Saint-Simon on horseback.”

It is in this period as well that banks came into their own as key agents of national economic development. In this, too, the credit must go to the post-Saint-Simonians (such as the brothers Pereire), who were “the first to realize the role of stimulus and coordinator that banks could play in economic life” (Chlepner, 1926, 15). But the story predates the brothers Pereire. From at least 1815 on, the biggest banks – notably the Rothschilds and the Barings – shifted their emphasis to long-term loans, first in negotiating and promoting loans to governments and second in sustaining large private enterprises. Since, as Landes (1956, 210 – 212) notes, were these banks to show “too voracious an appetite,” they could be undercut by competitors, they tended to form cartels. The Rothschilds in particular found their best profits in a tacit link with the Holy Alliance [“In September 1815, the three monarchs of the ‘east’ (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) signed the document that became known as the Holy Alliance – the pledge to work together to maintain the status quo in Europe, if necessary by intervention in countries threatened by revolution. Great Britain did not join the signatories.” p. 42... – P.S.] and were thus able to locate themselves in the principal money markets, which at that time were “more markets of demand than centers of money supply” (Gille, 1965, 98). Furthermore, the “favorite gambit” of the Rothschilds – the short-term emergency loan to a government in difficulty – was not necessarily an aid to national self-sufficiency. Cameron (1957b, 556) argues that such governments “rarely ever regained [their] independence” and compares the practice to a “habit-forming drug.” [And we... of course... immediately think of ‘payday lending’... which comparison succinctly expresses the downward trajectory of ‘the system’... its urgent sense that they must develop lock-down techniques to use on us that are guaranteed effective... before we get... globally... that their jig is up... and that it is for us imperative that we begin designing our alternative... – P.S.]

The need, of course, was for more locally controlled sources of credit. Chlepner (1926, 19) reminds us that, before the Credit Mobilier of the brothers Pereire, there were “predecessors” in Belgium – most notably the Societe Generale, founded by King William in 1822. It was, however, only after Belgium marked its independence in 1831 with the enthronement of Leopold I that the bank became a major actor in economic development, primarily in the construction of railways. If this bank and the rival Banque de Belgique, founded in 1835, both went into relative hibernation after the financial crisis of 1838, they were even harder hit by the Anglo-French economic crisis of 1846 – 1847. With this in the background, February 1848 led to fear of revolution, fear of the loss of independence, and a “veritable financial panic” (Chlepner, 1926, 238; see also 1931), which caused the state to come to the aid of the bank and end the period of agitation. Belgium thus was able to avoid the revolutionary upsurge and could then move to a more truly liberal system, eliminating the semiofficial character of the Societe Generale in 1851.

The banking controversies in Great Britain, previously discussed, created a situation in which the banks were unable to play a direct role in promoting economic growth. These controversies culminated in the Bank Act of 1844, whose objective, from Peel’s point of view, was primarily to “make more solid the foundations of the gold standard” and secondarily to remove the use of gold as an internal political weapon (Fetter, 1965, 192). Perhaps Great Britain could afford, better than other countries, not to have a banking policy that would promote economic growth. Cameron (1961,

58 – 59) calls this “inefficient” but notes that “paradoxically,... the very obstacles placed in the way of a rational banking and monetary system stimulated the private sector to introduce the financial innovations necessary for realization of the full benefits of technical innovation in industry.”

What the British state had promoted by its failures – an adequate supply of credit for the midcentury economic expansion – the French state under Napoleon III would create deliberately. The decree of February, 1852 authorizing the formation of mortgage banks, the Credit Foncier of Emile Pereire being one of the first, provided the financial underpinning for the reconstruction of Paris by Haussmann. “From a laggard, France became a leader and innovator in mortgage credit” (Cameron, 1961, 129). The Rothschilds were not happy. James de Rothschild argued that this change in structure would concentrate too much power in untried hands. It seems a case of the pot calling the kettle black. In any case, the rise of the great corporate banks of the Second Empire took the monopoly away from what had been called the *haute banque*, a “powerful group of private (unincorporated) bankers” (Cameron, 1953, 462). But the *haute banque* had not provided sufficient credit to *French* business enterprises.

Toward the end of the Second Empire, in 1867, the largest of the new banks, *Credit Mobilier*, failed. The Rothschilds, however, were still there, and are still there today. Nonetheless, the liberal state, by its intervention, had changed the worldwide credit structure of modern capitalism: “The banking system of every nation in Continental Europe bore the imprint of French influence” (Cameron, 1961, 203). The creation of larger numbers of banks oriented to the international market may have diminished the power of the *haute banque*. This was not necessarily a great virtue for the weaker state structures in tight financial situations. Jenks (1927, 273) discusses the perverse effect of greater competition in the field of loans to governments:

Competition simply augmented the risks of marketing the loan in the face of efforts of the unsuccessful banker to cry it down.... What the competition did encourage, however, was the pressing of more money upon frequently “bewildered” borrowers.... In a word, the loan business was monopolescent.

The collapse of *Credit Mobilier* gives credence to this analysis. It formed part of a sequence that led to the drying up of loans to weak governments and hence the accentuation of what was to become the Great Depression after 1873.

The liberals had achieved what they had hoped to achieve in midcentury. The long upswing of the world-economy and the actions of the governments of the core zone – in particular, of Great Britain and France – secured a steady process of worldwide relocations., until at least the end of the twentieth century. We may call this the “strong market,: one of the three pillars of the liberal world order that was to be the great achievement of the capitalist world-economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But there were two further pillars for a liberal world order: the strong state, and the strong interstate system. It is to the process of securing them that we now turn.

The absolute monarchies had not been strong states. Absolutism was merely the scaffolding within which weak states sought to become stronger. It would only be in the post-1789 world-system's atmosphere of normal change and popular sovereignty that one could build truly strong states – that is, states with an adequate bureaucratic structure and a reasonable degree of popular acquiescence (which in wartime could be converted into passionate patriotism).... [This strikes me as upside-down...

[This might be a good moment to revisit our earlier question:

“Two things stand out... one: “the supremacy game” the 'power'-guys are engaged in with each other... experimenting with their new toy... the 'powerful'... bureaucratic... nation-state – and two: their self-creation as 'global-state-statesmen'... with a common vision and purpose... inventing... as the key structural means for accomplishing this... an interstate 'mechanism' to ensure our – that is... we-the-people's – suppression... A question we should ask ourselves... I think... is... why... even in the analyses of those who have our interests in mind... these obvious motives of 'power' are not the starting point of these analyses – as they are for Kropotkin – and why... rather... our advocates help legitimate... and obscure... these unmistakable motives by employing the ideology of 'economic development'?”

Elsewhere on this webpage [listed in the menu] we posted comments on Chapter 1 of our Good Three's *Antisystemic Movements*... “Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group in a World Systems Perspective”:

All to say... consider this... that ‘war’ is not to reinvigorate dead markets... but to suppress our uprisings against injustice. In the *Waking Up Radio* show of March 9th, 2014 we said that...

"140309econtool.mp3": "The machinations of states is theater... with two tightly interwoven objectives: first... 'work steadily to conquer the people... according to "the laws" of hierarchy... i.e.... ensuring there are "winners" and "losers"... This is key overall strategy... And by the way... when we said that "the responsibility of 'the intellectual' is to stand with the people and renounce the privilege of standing apart..." – this is not a national project... a national Left is useless... it effectively means you stand with 'power'... agree to its terms... agree to betray your Brothers and Sisters who happen to be the designated 'losers'... globally speaking... So... ensuring that there are "winners" and "losers" is key strategy both for maintaining the undergirding ideology "merit rises" – the notion that there's some legitimate reason in this gross unfairness – behind the hideousness – and it's necessary for maintaining 'power's invisibility – the notion that there's just these "natural forces" at play... And... according to the "laws of PR-chest-pounding-posturing"... this must be on-going... And the second key objective: 'play the game of "Supremacy" successfully... using quantifying means to keep score... – otherwise known as "the economy"... while maintaining the chest-pounding to draw from the people the requisite energy...' We've said that the definition of "the economy" that's most authentic is "eating the earth..." controlling the resources of the planet... the most key one strategically being us... But... looking at Europe before the spread of fascism across it... 'socialism'... which in the people's minds simply meant 'freedom'... sweeping across Europe... 'infecting' the colonies even... So... that resource which is absolutely key was at risk of being lost... So 'economy' geared up... for 'destroying' is also 'consuming': removing resources from *our* use... so 'eating the earth' can be destroying the earth by means of war... or destroying the earth by means of what's called 'growing the economy'... 'development'. The book *Savage Continent* (by Keith Lowe) provides prodigious illustration of resources being removed from our use... and... turned back over to 'power'... Keith Lowe describes... an orgy of destructiveness. This systematic attack on 'economic life' was itself the 'economic system' working at a clip (because the point is privatization plus privatization equals control of us... manufactured 'scarcity'...) racing at a pace unequalled since... The 'economic system' is not 'capitalism'.... It's called 'power'... and they invent a tool called 'the economy' to keep us confused... War is an expression of this 'economic system'... and 'the economy' is war by other means... i.e.... it's about controlling the energy of the majority... the goal being... to beat us into submission... and... in the 'normal' course of events... overt violence is (as Solozzo said...) "too expensive..." in terms of maintaining legitimacy... as a means of controlling. And so they 'normally' rely on Bentham... whose Panoptic guidance says: "wage war by other means... i.e. be 'economic'... and 'efficient'..." "Let the weight of scarcity weigh on their minds..." Bentham advised...." [From the March 9, 2014 *Waking Up Radio* show... and discussed as well during the October 18, 2015 show.]

But when the people arise... 'economy'... 'efficiency'... and all that jazz... flies out the door...

...and in walks war.

'Economy' is just a tool... like any other technology.

So 'war' is always war on us... whether they spill our guts with guns... or markets.

The economy is just war by other means... and war is the profligate failure of 'breeding'... to control the energy of the majority (the true point of the 'education' we're all given.)

What they (the 'power'-guys...) hate most... is resistance. What they love most... is obedience – (From our commentary on Chapter 1 in *Antisystemic Movements*... "Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group in a World Systems Perspective") – P.S.]

...The absolute monarchies had not been strong states. Absolutism was merely the scaffolding within which weak states sought to become stronger. It would only be in the post-1789 world-system's atmosphere of normal change and popular sovereignty that one could build truly strong states – that is, states with an adequate bureaucratic structure and a reasonable degree of popular acquiescence (which in wartime could be converted into passionate patriotism). And it was the liberals, and only the liberals, who could construct such states in the core zones of the world-system. Bureaucratic growth was the essential pendant of economic growth, at least of economic growth at the scale that capitalists now hoped for and that was not technologically possible.

Of course, the construction of a strong bureaucratic state was a long process that had begun in the late fifteenth century. Resistance to such construction is what we really mean when we refer to an *ancien regime*, which of course existed quite as much in Great Britain as in France, as indeed it did throughout Europe and most of the world. What we may call

generically Colbertism was the attempt to overcome this resistance by taking real power from the local level and concentrating it in the hands of the monarch. It was at best partially successful. Jacobinism was nothing but Colbertism with a republican face. It died in its original form in 1815. After 1815, it would be liberalism that took up the battle to create a strong state. Whereas Colbertism and Jacobinism had been brutally frank about their intentions, the fact that liberals refused to acknowledge that building the strong state was their intention – in many ways, their priority [... 'power' had gone undercover... where they remain to this day... and may they so remain even when we have reclaimed our lives from them... – P.S.] – was perhaps precisely why they were able to succeed better than the Colbertists and the Jacobins. Indeed, they succeeded so well that the enlightened conservatives took up this same objective, largely effacing in the process any ideological distinction between themselves and the liberals.

Of course, there are many reasons why capitalists find strong states useful. One is to help them accumulate capital; a second is to guarantee this capital [I much prefer the way Kropotkin puts it: “The State was established for the precise purpose of imposing the rule of the landowners, the employers of industry, the warrior class, and the clergy upon the peasants on the land and the artisans in the city. And the rich perfectly well know that if the machinery of the State ceased to protect them, their power over the laboring classes would be gone immediately.” – Precisely... to impose 'rule' by the Infinitesimal Few... but not for simple 'gain'... but rather to make of Society... a 'Perfect Order'... a mission they use to excuse an unimaginable hubris... and brutality... – P.S.]. But after 1848, capitalists fully realized, if they had not before, that only the strong state – that is, the reformist state – could buffer them against the winds of worker discontent. Pireire put his finger on it: “The 'strong' state became the welfare state of large-scale (*grand*) capitalism” (cited in Bouvier, 1967, 166). Of course, “welfare state” here has a double connotation – the welfare of the working classes to be sure, but the welfare of the capitalists as well.

We think of Victorian Great Britain as the locus of antistatism in its heyday, and it is quite true that “in general, [most Englishmen] were suspicious of the State and of centralization...

(Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789 – 1914*, p. 102 – 119)

... – P.S.]

[Returning to Alice... and skipping ahead...]

In the three scenes that follow, we see vivid examples of how the principles described above can be put into practice. I quote these passages at such length in order to give the reader an idea of the atmosphere these children (i.e., if not we ourselves, then at least our parents) breathed in daily. This material helps us to understand how neuroses develop. They are not caused by an external event but by repression of the innumerable psychological factors making up the child's daily life that the child is never capable of describing because he or she doesn't know that things can be any other way. [The totalitarian state – which is what we got today... must be systematically replaced... with new thoughts... – P.S.]

Until the time he was four, I taught little Konrad four essentials: to pay attention, to obey, to behave himself, and to be moderate in his desires.

The first I accomplished by continually showing him all kinds of animal, flowers, and other wonders of nature and by explaining pictures to him: the second by constantly making him, whenever he was in my presence, do things at my bidding; the third by inviting children to come play with him from time to time when I was present, and whenever a quarrel arose, I carefully determined who had started it and removed the culprit from the game for a time; the fourth I taught him by often denying him something he asked for with great agitation. Once, for example, I cut up a honeycomb and brought a large dishful into the room. “Honey! Honey!” he cried joyfully. “Father, give me some honey,” pulled his chair to the table, sat down, and waited for me to spread a few rolls with honey for him. I didn't do it but set the honey before him and said: “I'm not going to give you any honey yet; first we will plant some peas in the garden; then, when that is done, we will enjoy a roll with honey together.” He looked first at me, then at the honey, whereupon he went to the garden with me. Also, when serving food, I always arranged it so that he was the last one served. For example, my parents and little Christel were eating with us once, and we had rice pudding, which he especially liked. “Pudding!” he cried joyfully, embracing his mother. “Yes,” I said, “it's rice pudding. Little Konrad shall have some, too. First the big people shall have some, and afterwards the little people. Here, Grandmother, is some pudding for you. Here, Grandfather, is some for you, too! Here, Mother, is some for you. This is

for Father, this for Christel, and this? Whom do you think this is for?" "Onrad," he responded joyfully. He did not find this arrangement unjust, and I saved myself all the vexation parents have who give their children the first portion of whatever is brought to the table. [Salzmann (1796), quoted in Rutschky]

The "little people" sit quietly at the table and wait. This need not be demeaning. It all depends on the adult's intention – and here the adult in question shows unabashedly how much he enjoys his power and his bigness at the expense of the little ones.

Something similar occurs in the next story, in which telling a lie is the only possible way for the child to read in privacy:

A lie is something dishonorable. It is recognized as such even by those who tell one, and there probably isn't a single liar who has any self-respect. But someone who doesn't respect himself doesn't respect others either, and the liar thus finds himself excluded from human society to a certain extent....